dw做的网站怎么做后台,广东新闻联播2011,湖北短视频seo,做非法网站会怎样认证机制
对于数据库系统来说#xff0c;其作为服务端#xff0c;接受来自客户端的请求。对此#xff0c;必须有对客户端的认证机制#xff0c;只有通过身份认证的客户端才可以访问数据库资源#xff0c;防止非法用户连接数据库。PostgreSQL支持认证方法有很多#xff1…认证机制
对于数据库系统来说其作为服务端接受来自客户端的请求。对此必须有对客户端的认证机制只有通过身份认证的客户端才可以访问数据库资源防止非法用户连接数据库。PostgreSQL支持认证方法有很多
typedef enum UserAuth
{uaReject,uaImplicitReject, /* Not a user-visible option */uaTrust,uaIdent,uaPassword,uaMD5,uaSCRAM,uaGSS,uaSSPI,uaPAM,uaBSD,uaLDAP,uaCert,uaRADIUS,uaPeer
#define USER_AUTH_LAST uaPeer /* Must be last value of this enum */
} UserAuth;对此我们仅分析常用的口令认证方式。目前PostgreSQL支持MD5、SCRAM-SHA-256对密码哈希和身份验证支持建议使用SCRAM-SHA-256相较MD5安全性更高。不同的基于口令的认证方法的可用性取决于用户的口令在服务器上是如何被加密或者更准确地说是哈希的。这由设置口令时的配置参数password_encryption控制。可用值为scham-sha-256、md5。
host all all 0.0.0.0/0 scham-sha-256口令认证并不是简单的客户端告诉服务端密码服务端比对成功就可以了。而是要设计一个客户端和服务器协商身份验证机制避免密码明文存储等等问题。对此PostgreSQL引入SCRAM身份验证机制RFC5802、RFC7677 也就是说后面的口令认证方法中遵循的是如上的口令认证协议。
参考文档53.3.1. SCRAM-SHA-256认证
源码分析
这里只分析口令认证的情况。 口令认证分为明文口令认证和加密口令认证。明文口令认证要求客户端提供一个未加密的口令进行认证安全性较差已经被禁止使用。加密口令认证要求客户端提供一个经过SCRAM-SHA-256加密的口令进行认证该口令在传送过程中使用了结合salt的单向哈希加密增强了安全性。口令都存储在pg_authid系统表中可通过CREATE USER test WITH PASSWORD ******;等命令进行设置。
客户端
以psql客户端为例当客户端发出连接请求后分析口令认证的过程。
main
-- parse_psql_options(argc, argv, options);// 连接数据库中间会有认证这块有不同的认证方法这里列的是口令认证方式的流程
-- do {// 输入host、port、user、password、dbname等信息PQconnectdbParams(keywords, values, true);-- PQconnectStartParams(keywords, values, expand_dbname);-- makeEmptyPGconn();-- conninfo_array_parse(keywords, values, conn-errorMessage, true, expand_dbname);-- fillPGconn(conn, connOptions)-- connectDBStart(conn)-- PQconnectPoll(conn) // 尝试建立TCP连接-- socket(addr_cur-ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);-- connect(conn-sock, addr_cur-ai_addr, addr_cur-ai_addrlen)-- connectDBComplete(conn);// 认证这块与数据库服务端交互以及状态很多这里没有全部列出。-- PQconnectPoll(conn);-- pqReadData(conn);-- pqsecure_read(conn, conn-inBuffer conn-inEnd, conn-inBufSize - conn-inEnd);-- pqsecure_raw_read(conn, ptr, len);-- recv(conn-sock, ptr, len, 0);-- pg_fe_sendauth(areq, msgLength, conn);-- pg_SASL_init(conn, payloadlen)-- conn-sasl-init(conn,password,selected_mechanism);-- pg_saslprep(password, prep_password);-- conn-sasl-exchange(conn-sasl_state, NULL, -1, initialresponse, initialresponselen, done, success);-- build_client_first_message(state);-- pg_strong_random(raw_nonce, SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN)PQconnectionNeedsPassword(pset.db) // 是否需要密码如果需要等待用户数据密码}// 进入主循环等待用户输入命令执行命令
-- MainLoop(stdin); -- psql_scan_create(psqlscan_callbacks);-- while (successResult EXIT_SUCCESS){// 等待用户输入命令gets_interactive(get_prompt(prompt_status, cond_stack), query_buf);SendQuery(query_buf-data); // 把用户输入的SQL命令发送到数据库服务-- ExecQueryAndProcessResults(query, elapsed_msec, svpt_gone, false, NULL, NULL) 0);-- PQsendQuery(pset.db, query); // 通过libpq与数据库交互-- PQgetResult(pset.db);}服务端
服务端相关流程
main()
-- PostmasterMain(argc, argv);-- InitProcessGlobals(); // set MyProcPid, MyStartTime[stamp], random seeds-- pg_prng_strong_seed(pg_global_prng_state)-- srandom(pg_prng_uint32(pg_global_prng_state));-- InitializeGUCOptions();-- ProcessConfigFile(PGC_POSTMASTER);-- ProcessConfigFileInternal(context, true, elevel);-- ParseConfigFp(fp, abs_path, depth, elevel, head_p, tail_p);-- load_hba() // 读pg_hba.conf-- parse_hba_line(tok_line, LOG) // 解析pg_hba.conf中的每条记录,解析到HbaLine的链表结构中-- load_ident()-- ServerLoop();-- BackendStartup(port);-- InitPostmasterChild();-- BackendInitialize(port);-- pq_init();-- RegisterTimeout(STARTUP_PACKET_TIMEOUT, StartupPacketTimeoutHandler);-- enable_timeout_after(STARTUP_PACKET_TIMEOUT, AuthenticationTimeout * 1000);-- ProcessStartupPacket(port, false, false); // Read a clients startup packet-- pq_startmsgread();-- pq_getbytes((char *) len, 1)-- InitProcess();-- BackendRun(port);-- PostgresMain(port-database_name, port-user_name);-- BaseInit();// 在接收用户SQL请求前进行认证-- InitPostgres(dbname, InvalidOid, username, InvalidOid,!am_walsender, false, NULL);-- PerformAuthentication(MyProcPort);-- enable_timeout_after(STATEMENT_TIMEOUT, AuthenticationTimeout * 1000);-- ClientAuthentication(port);-- hba_getauthmethod(port);-- check_hba(port);// 根据不同的认证方法进行认证-- switch (port-hba-auth_method){ case uaTrust:status STATUS_OK;break;case uaMD5:case uaSCRAM:// 口令认证status CheckPWChallengeAuth(port, logdetail);-- break;// ...}-- if (status STATUS_OK)sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_OK, NULL, 0);elseauth_failed(port, status, logdetail);-- disable_timeout(STATEMENT_TIMEOUT, false);-- initialize_acl();// 认证通过后才能接受用户的SQL请求-- for (;;){// ...exec_simple_query(query_string);}每次客户端发起连接时postgres主进程都会fork一个子进程
static int BackendStartup(Port *port)
{// ...pid fork_process();if (pid 0) /* child */{free(bn);/* Detangle from postmaster */InitPostmasterChild();/* Close the postmasters sockets */ClosePostmasterPorts(false);/* Perform additional initialization and collect startup packet */BackendInitialize(port);/** Create a per-backend PGPROC struct in shared memory. We must do* this before we can use LWLocks. In the !EXEC_BACKEND case (here)* this could be delayed a bit further, but EXEC_BACKEND needs to do* stuff with LWLocks before PostgresMain(), so we do it here as well* for symmetry.*/InitProcess(); /* And run the backend */BackendRun(port); // }
}每个子进程在接收用户的SQL请求前需要先进行认证。主要实现在ClientAuthentication函数中通过认证才能继续进行下一步。
/** Client authentication starts here. If there is an error, this* function does not return and the backend process is terminated. */
void ClientAuthentication(Port *port)
{int status STATUS_ERROR;const char *logdetail NULL;hba_getauthmethod(port);/** This is the first point where we have access to the hba record for the* current connection, so perform any verifications based on the hba* options field that should be done *before* the authentication here. */if (port-hba-clientcert ! clientCertOff){/* If we havent loaded a root certificate store, fail */if (!secure_loaded_verify_locations())ereport(FATAL,(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),errmsg(client certificates can only be checked if a root certificate store is available)));/* If we loaded a root certificate store, and if a certificate is* present on the client, then it has been verified against our root* certificate store, and the connection would have been aborted* already if it didnt verify ok. */if (!port-peer_cert_valid)ereport(FATAL,(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION), errmsg(connection requires a valid client certificate)));}// 根据不同的认证方法进行不同的处理switch (port-hba-auth_method){// ...case uaMD5:case uaSCRAM:status CheckPWChallengeAuth(port, logdetail);break;case uaPassword:status CheckPasswordAuth(port, logdetail);break;case uaTrust:status STATUS_OK;break;}if ((status STATUS_OK port-hba-clientcert clientCertFull)|| port-hba-auth_method uaCert){/** Make sure we only check the certificate if we use the cert method* or verify-full option.*/
#ifdef USE_SSLstatus CheckCertAuth(port);
#elseAssert(false);
#endif}if (ClientAuthentication_hook)(*ClientAuthentication_hook) (port, status);if (status STATUS_OK)sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_OK, NULL, 0);elseauth_failed(port, status, logdetail);
}对于口令认证具体实现为CheckPWChallengeAuth函数。
/* MD5 and SCRAM authentication. */
static int CheckPWChallengeAuth(Port *port, const char **logdetail)
{int auth_result;char *shadow_pass;PasswordType pwtype;/* First look up the users password. */ // 查找pg_authid系统表中的用户密码shadow_pass get_role_password(port-user_name, logdetail);if (!shadow_pass)pwtype Password_encryption;elsepwtype get_password_type(shadow_pass);/* If md5 authentication is allowed, decide whether to perform md5 or* scram-sha-256 authentication based on the type of password the user* has. If its an MD5 hash, we must do MD5 authentication, and if its a* SCRAM secret, we must do SCRAM authentication.** If MD5 authentication is not allowed, always use SCRAM. If the user* had an MD5 password, CheckSASLAuth() with the SCRAM mechanism will fail. */if (port-hba-auth_method uaMD5 pwtype PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5)auth_result CheckMD5Auth(port, shadow_pass, logdetail);elseauth_result CheckSASLAuth(pg_be_scram_mech, port, shadow_pass,logdetail);if (shadow_pass)pfree(shadow_pass);/* If get_role_password() returned error, return error, even if the authentication succeeded. */if (!shadow_pass){Assert(auth_result ! STATUS_OK);return STATUS_ERROR;}if (auth_result STATUS_OK)set_authn_id(port, port-user_name);return auth_result;
}int CheckSASLAuth(const pg_be_sasl_mech *mech, Port *port, char *shadow_pass, const char **logdetail)
{StringInfoData sasl_mechs;int mtype;StringInfoData buf;void *opaq NULL;char *output NULL;int outputlen 0;const char *input;int inputlen;int result;bool initial;/** Send the SASL authentication request to user. It includes the list of* authentication mechanisms that are supported.*/initStringInfo(sasl_mechs);mech-get_mechanisms(port, sasl_mechs);/* Put another \0 to mark that list is finished. */appendStringInfoChar(sasl_mechs, \0);sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SASL, sasl_mechs.data, sasl_mechs.len);pfree(sasl_mechs.data);/** Loop through SASL message exchange. This exchange can consist of* multiple messages sent in both directions. First message is always* from the client. All messages from client to server are password* packets (type p).*/initial true;do{pq_startmsgread();mtype pq_getbyte();if (mtype ! p){/* Only log error if client didnt disconnect. */if (mtype ! EOF){ereport(ERROR,(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION), errmsg(expected SASL response, got message type %d,mtype)));}elsereturn STATUS_EOF;}/* Get the actual SASL message */initStringInfo(buf);if (pq_getmessage(buf, PG_MAX_SASL_MESSAGE_LENGTH)){/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged error */pfree(buf.data);return STATUS_ERROR;}elog(DEBUG4, processing received SASL response of length %d, buf.len);/* The first SASLInitialResponse message is different from the others.* It indicates which SASL mechanism the client selected, and contains* an optional Initial Client Response payload. The subsequent* SASLResponse messages contain just the SASL payload. */if (initial){const char *selected_mech;selected_mech pq_getmsgrawstring(buf);/** Initialize the status tracker for message exchanges.** If the user doesnt exist, or doesnt have a valid password, or* its expired, we still go through the motions of SASL* authentication, but tell the authentication method that the* authentication is doomed. That is, its going to fail, no matter what.** This is because we dont want to reveal to an attacker what* usernames are valid, nor which users have a valid password. */opaq mech-init(port, selected_mech, shadow_pass);inputlen pq_getmsgint(buf, 4);if (inputlen -1)input NULL;elseinput pq_getmsgbytes(buf, inputlen);initial false;}else{inputlen buf.len;input pq_getmsgbytes(buf, buf.len);}pq_getmsgend(buf);/* Hand the incoming message to the mechanism implementation. */result mech-exchange(opaq, input, inputlen,output, outputlen,logdetail);/* input buffer no longer used */pfree(buf.data);if (output){/*PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_FAILURE with some output is forbidden by SASL.Make sure here that the mechanism used got that right. */if (result PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_FAILURE)elog(ERROR, output message found after SASL exchange failure);/* Negotiation generated data to be sent to the client. */elog(DEBUG4, sending SASL challenge of length %d, outputlen);if (result PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_SUCCESS)sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN, output, outputlen);elsesendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SASL_CONT, output, outputlen);pfree(output);}} while (result PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_CONTINUE);/* Oops, Something bad happened */if (result ! PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_SUCCESS){return STATUS_ERROR;}return STATUS_OK;
}
